Date: 07-29-2016

Case Style: MINNEHAHA COUNTY SHERIFF MIKE MILSTEAD and STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA v. JOSEPH PATRICK JOHNSON

Case Number: 2016 S.D. 56

Judge: Janine M. Kern

Court: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Aaron McGowan

Kersten Kappmeyer

Defendant's Attorney:

Beau Blouin

Description: On April 30, 2014, Minnehaha County Detectives Joe Bosman, Craig
Butler, and Ryan Qualseth arrested Joseph Patrick Johnson on a misdemeanor
child-support warrant. He was later indicted for several offenses, including two
counts of simple assault against a law enforcement officer (Detective Qualseth).
Detective Qualseth was the only detective involved in the physical altercation with
Johnson. On September 5, 2014, Johnson served a subpoena duces tecum on
Minnehaha County Sheriff Mike Milstead requesting production of “[a]ll
disciplinary records/reports, disciplinary actions or complaints made against the
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following Minnehaha County Sheriff Department’s employees: Detective Joe
Bosman, Detective Craig Butler, and Detective Ryan Qualseth.”1
[¶3.] On November 19, 2014, Sheriff Milstead filed a motion to quash the
subpoena, arguing it was “unreasonable and oppressive.” The court held a motions
hearing on December 3, 2014. A Minnehaha County deputy state’s attorney from
the civil division represented Sheriff Milstead and a deputy state’s attorney from
the criminal division represented the State. Johnson argued that access to the
requested records was necessary for effective cross-examination under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution in order to present his theory of the
case. Johnson informed the court that he was not claiming that he acted in self
defense. Rather, he contended that Detective Qualseth used excessive force against
1. Johnson also filed a motion to compel the production of discovery material under Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Brady established a duty to produce to a defendant “evidence [that] is material either to [his or her] guilt or to punishment.” Id. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1197. This duty includes the disclosure of material evidence affecting the credibility of a witness “[w]hen the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.’” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959)). Evidence is material for purposes of Brady only if there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the material was disclosed to the defense. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985). Although the State and Sheriff Milstead argued Brady did not apply to the records, they informed the court that all exculpatory information in the possession of the State or the Sheriff, including any information relating to the characters of the deputies for truthfulness, had been disclosed to Johnson. At a subsequent motions hearing the circuit court denied the motion. Regardless, Johnson did not file a notice of review from the denial of the court’s motion; therefore, we do not address whether the personnel files of law enforcement officers are discoverable under Brady.
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him during his arrest and that Detective Qualseth was the aggressor. Johnson
denied assaulting the officers. In response to the discovery request, Sheriff
Milstead argued that the subpoena, in addition to being unreasonable and
oppressive was nothing more than a “fishing expedition.” He further asserted that
the requested documents, even if produced, would be irrelevant and inadmissible
under the rules of evidence. In response, Johnson argued that relevancy is a
question to be determined at trial.
[¶4.] The circuit court denied in part Sheriff Milstead’s motion to quash the
subpoena. The court ordered Sheriff Milstead to produce the following documents
for in camera review: 1) “[c]omplaints against Detective Qualseth for excessive force
or aggression[,]” 2) “disciplinary records involving the incident for which the
Defendant is charged with in this case[,]” and 3) “[d]isciplinary actions taken
against any of the three officers because of this matter.” In addition to its oral
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the circuit court entered written findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and an order on January 20, 2015.
[¶5.] In February 2015 Sheriff Milstead petitioned this Court for an
intermediate appeal from the circuit court’s order. We granted the request on April
6, 2015. The State, through the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney’s Office, filed a
brief in support of Sheriff Milstead’s position.
[¶6.] On appeal, Sheriff Milstead raises two issues:
1. Whether the circuit court erred in holding that a law enforcement officer’s personnel file is discoverable under SDCL 23A-14-5 (Rule 17(c)).
2. Whether the circuit court erred in ordering an in camera review of portions of the three detectives’ personnel files.
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Standard of Review
[¶7.] Ordinarily, “[w]e review the [circuit] court’s rulings on discovery
matters under an abuse of discretion standard.” Anderson v. Keller, 2007 S.D. 89,
¶ 5, 739 N.W.2d 35, 37. However, the question whether the circuit court erred when
it interpreted SDCL 23A-14-5 to permit discovery raises a question of statutory
interpretation and application, which we review de novo. Deadwood Stage Run,
LLC v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue, 2014 S.D. 90, ¶ 7, 857 N.W.2d 606, 609.
Analysis
1. Whether the circuit court erred in holding that a law enforcement officer’s personnel file is discoverable under SDCL 23A-14-5 (Rule 17(c)).
[¶8.] The question whether a law enforcement officer’s personnel records are
subject to discovery in a criminal prosecution is a question of first impression before
this Court.2 Johnson contends that these records, although confidential, are
relevant to the primary issue in this case: “whether Detective Qualseth, or Johnson,
2. Other jurisdictions addressed this question in earnest beginning as early as the 1970s. The jurisdictions passed legislation and developed jurisprudence related to the application of their statutory schemes. For a discussion on the plethora of issues regarding the production of personnel records and the approaches taken by varying state and federal jurisdictions, see Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Accused’s Right to Discovery or Inspection of Records of Prior Complaints Against, or Similar Personnel Records of, Peace Officer Involved in the Case, 86 A.L.R.3d 1170 (1978), Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files & the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 743 (2015), Lis Wiehl, Keeping Files on the File Keepers: When Prosecutors are Forced to Turn Over the Personnel Files of Federal Agents to Defense Lawyers, 72 Wash. L. Rev. 73 (1997).
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was the true aggressor.” Johnson asserts the records are necessary to present his
defense and fully cross-examine the State’s witnesses.
[¶9.] South Dakota lacks detailed legislation specific to the production of
law enforcement personnel records.3 Accordingly, we look to statutes addressing
personnel records generally and the constitutional principles involved in production
of confidential materials. SDCL 1-27-1.1 broadly defines public records as including
personnel records. Although public records are generally open to inspection and
copying pursuant to SDCL 1-27-1.1, certain public records are not. These excluded
records include “[p]ersonnel information other than salaries and routine directory
information.” SDCL 1-27-1.5(7).
[¶10.] Although personnel records are statutorily protected, that protection is
not absolute. A defendant has a fundamental right to proffer a defense. State v.
Huber, 2010 S.D. 63, ¶ 37, 789 N.W.2d 283, 294. This includes the right to call
3. Two of the nation’s biggest jurisdictions—California and New York—have developed detailed bodies of legislation to govern this question. The Supreme Court of California in 1974 addressed the issue in Pitchess v. Superior Court authorizing the release of personnel records of law enforcement officers to civil litigants and criminal defendants. 522 P.2d 305, 311 (Cal. 1974). The California Legislature, in response to the opinion, defined personnel records, codified the privileges surrounding them, and set out detailed procedures for discovery of the records. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 832.7; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043–1045. For a summary of California’s procedures, see City of Santa Cruz v. Mun. Court, 776 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1989), Warrick v. Superior Court, 112 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2005). Likewise, the State of New York has a statutory scheme in which the personnel files of police officers are confidential and not subject to disclosure except upon a specified showing by a criminal defendant. See N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50-a (McKinney 2014). See also Gary R. DeFilippo, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: A Discussion of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, Protecting Law Enforcement Officers’ Personnel Records from Unwarranted Review, 14 J. Suffolk Acad. L. 103, 105 (2000).
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witnesses on one’s behalf and to confront and cross-examine the prosecution’s
witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony. See U.S. Const. amends.
VI, XIV; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 7; State v. Beckley, 2007 S.D. 122, ¶ 9, 742 N.W.2d
841, 844. It is a basic tenant “of American jurisprudence that a statutory provision
never be allowed to trump a Constitutional right.” State v. Karlen, 1999 S.D. 12,
¶ 39, 589 N.W.2d 594, 602-03. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 42-43, 107 S.
Ct. 989, 993-94, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987), and Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 309, 94
S. Ct. 1105, 1107, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974), the Supreme Court of the United States
addressed this interplay between the important constitutional rights of an accused
and public policy concerns regarding the protection of documents.
[¶11.] In Davis, the Court held that a defendant’s right to effective cross
examination under the Confrontation Clause required that a defendant be able to
question an adverse witness regarding the witness’s confidential juvenile record.
415 U.S. at 309, 94 S. Ct. at 1107. The Court stated, “The State’s policy interest in
protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender’s record cannot require yielding
of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an
adverse witness.” Id. at 320, 94 S. Ct. at 1112.
[¶12.] Similarly, in Ritchie, the Court considered “whether and to what
extent a State’s interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning
child abuse must yield to a criminal defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
right to discover favorable evidence.” 480 U.S. at 42-43, 107 S. Ct. at 993-94.
Ritchie was charged with the rape of his minor child and had subpoenaed a file held
by Child and Youth Services (CYS) containing information about the charge and
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other records. CYS refused to produce the records, even for an in camera review,
arguing that they were privileged under Pennsylvania law. The Ritchie Court held
that the Confrontation Clause does not create “a constitutionally compelled rule of
pretrial discovery.” Id. at 52, 107 S. Ct. at 999. Instead, it affords criminal
defendants two specific protections: “the right physically to face those who testify
against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.” Id. at 51, 107 S. Ct. at
998.
[¶13.] Although the Confrontation Clause provides individuals with “the
right to cross-examine those who testify against” them, it is well recognized “that
the right to cross-examine is not absolute.” Karlen, 1999 S.D. 12, ¶¶ 36-38, 589
N.W.2d 594, 602 (citing Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 53, 107 S. Ct. at 999). An individual is
only guaranteed “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish.” Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 53, 107 S. Ct. at 999 (emphasis added) (quoting
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985)).
The Court recognized the strong “public interest in protecting this type of sensitive
information” but also noted that such interest does not necessarily prevent
disclosure in all circumstances. Id. at 57, 107 S. Ct. at 1001. Ultimately, the Court
decided that due process requires an in camera review of the privileged file,
especially when the discovery sought was material. In defining material evidence,
the Ritchie Court stated:
[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable
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probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Id. at 57, 107 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S. Ct. at 3383).
[¶14.] Although this Court has not previously addressed personnel records,
we have analyzed requests for production of privileged documents by subpoena
duces tecum. In Karlen, the defendant was convicted at trial of several felonies,
including rape in the second degree against A.J. 1999 S.D. 12, ¶ 4, 589 N.W.2d at
597. Prior to trial, Karlen sought A.J.’s counseling records, which were protected by
the physician-patient privilege. Karlen argued that, at a minimum, such “records
should have been reviewed in camera to determine whether exculpatory or
contradictory information was present.” Id. ¶ 28, 589 N.W.2d at 600. Karlen made
a specialized showing contending: (1) that the evidence at trial showed that the
victim had provided inconsistent statements regarding the incidents with which
Karlen was charged, and (2) that the counseling records may contain evidence
which would affect A.J.’s credibility and/or may exonerate Karlen.
[¶15.] We reversed the circuit court, relying in part upon Ritchie, finding that
in light of the specific facts of the case, Karlen may have been denied information
crucial to his defense. Karlen, 1999 S.D. 12, ¶ 46, 589 N.W.2d at 605. In concluding
that Karlen was entitled to production of A.J.’s counseling records, we found that
Karlen had made a sufficient showing that the evidence he sought was material and
not for the purpose of a generalized attack upon A.J.’s credibility. The requested
evidence was “directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior
motives as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.”
Id. ¶ 44, 589 N.W.2d at 604 (quoting State v. Sprik, 520 N.W.2d 595, 600 (S.D.
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1994)). Finding that Karlen may have been denied his right to effectively cross
examine A.J., we ordered production of the records for in camera review by the
circuit court. We directed the court to release only the relevant portions of the
records to the parties. Thus, we have previously ordered the production of even
statutorily privileged materials for in camera review when principles of due process
so require. However we did not discuss the parameters for discovery of documents
under SDCL 23A-14-5 (Rule 17(c)) as the issue was not raised.
[¶16.] It is against this backdrop that we consider the question whether the
personnel records of law enforcement officers are discoverable under SDCL 23A-14
5 (Rule 17(c)). The rules of discovery in criminal cases are set forth in SDCL
chapter 23A-13 (Rule 16). The rules governing the subpoena and attendance of
witnesses are set forth in SDCL chapter 23A-14 (Rule 17). SDCL 23A-14-5 (Rule
17(c)) provides for the production of documents and objects and is substantially
similar to the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)(1)-(2).4 We routinely look to
4. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) provides, (c) Producing Documents and Objects. (1) In General. A subpoena may order the witness to produce any books, papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates. The court may direct the witness to produce the designated items in court before trial or before they are to be offered in evidence. When the items arrive, the court may permit the parties and their attorneys to inspect all or part of them. (2) Quashing or Modifying the Subpoena. On motion made promptly, the court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. (3) Subpoena for Personal or Confidential Information About a Victim. After a complaint, indictment, or (continued . . .)
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the decisions of other courts for analytical assistance when a South Dakota statute
is “substantially the same as its federal counterpart,” as such decisions are
particularly instructive. See, e.g., Jacquot v. Rozum, 2010 S.D. 84, ¶ 15, 790 N.W.2d
498, 503. As SDCL 23A-14-55 is substantially similar to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17(c)(1)-(2), we examine the seminal cases addressing the use of
subpoenas and the tests which have been developed.
[¶17.] The Supreme Court of the United States first addressed production of
documents under Rule 17(c) in Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, where it
considered the denial of a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum. 341 U.S. 214,
217, 71 S. Ct. 675, 677, 95 L. Ed. 879 (1951). In its analysis, the Court
differentiated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 from Rule 17(c). “Rule 16
deals with documents and other materials that are in the possession of the
__________________ (. . . continued) information is filed, a subpoena requiring the production of personal or confidential information about a victim may be served on a third party only by court order. Before entering the order and unless there are exceptional circumstances, the court must require giving notice to the victim so that the victim can move to quash or modify the subpoena or otherwise object. 5. SDCL 23A-14-5 provides, A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce books, papers, documents, or other objects designated therein. A court on motion made promptly may quash or modify a subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. A court may direct that books, papers, documents, or objects designated in a subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, or documents, or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.
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Government and provides how they may be made available to the defendant for his
information.” Id. at 219, 71 S. Ct. at 678. Rule 17(c), in contrast, provides a method
for the defendant to subpoena such documents and materials for his or her personal
use if they are not put into evidence by the government. However, “Rule 17(c) was
not intended to provide an additional means of discovery. Its chief innovation was
to expedite the trial by providing a time and place before trial for the inspection of
the subpoenaed materials.” Id. at 220, 71 S. Ct. at 679. Furthermore, Rule 17 was
not intended “to give a right of discovery in the broadest terms.” Id. To construe
Rule 17 as a generalized tool for discovery would render Rule 16’s requirements
“nugatory and meaningless.” United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 369 (D.D.C.
1954); see also United States v. Binday, 908 F. Supp. 2d 485, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Further, a court may “control the use of Rule 17(c) . . . by its power to rule on
motions to quash or modify.” Bowman, 341 U.S. at 220, 71 S. Ct. at 678.
[¶18.] Roughly one year later, in United States v. Iozia, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that “there must be a
showing of good cause to entitle the defendant to production and inspection of
documents under Rule 17(c).” 13 F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The court
identified a four-part test to assist trial courts in ruling on requests under Rule
17(c). The test required the defendant to establish:
(1) That the documents are evidentiary and relevant;
(2) That they are not otherwise procurable by the defendant reasonably in advance of trial by the exercise of due diligence;
(3) That the defendant cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and
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the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial;
(4) That the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general fishing expedition.
Id.
[¶19.] In 1974, the Supreme Court of the United States again addressed the
use of subpoenas under Rule 17(c) in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct.
3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974). The prosecutor filed a motion under Rule 17(c) for a
subpoena duces tecum ordering the production of certain tapes and documents
relating to “precisely identified” meetings and conversations involving the President
and others. Id. at 687-88, 94 S. Ct. at 3097. The Court discussed the factors set
forth in Iozia and distilled them, requiring the prosecutor to “clear three hurdles: (1)
relevancy; (2) admissibility; [and] (3) specificity” for production of the documents.
Id. at 700, 94 S. Ct. at 3103. In denying the President’s motion to quash the
subpoena, the Court noted that “[a] subpoena for documents may be quashed if
their production would be ‘unreasonable or oppressive,’ but not otherwise.” Id. at
698, 94 S. Ct. at 3103. The Court found that the prosecutor was permitted to obtain
the requested audio tapes because he had shown “there was a sufficient likelihood
that each of the tapes contain[ed] conversations relevant to the offenses charged in
the indictment.” Id. at 700, 94 S. Ct. at 3103. The prosecutor met this burden by
offering sworn testimony of participants in the recorded conversations or by giving
reasons that permitted a rational inference of relevance, as well as by making a
sufficient preliminary showing of admissibility.
[¶20.] The Nixon test is well reasoned. Many state and federal jurisdictions
have adopted the test, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, providing
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numerous decisions to reference for guidance.6 We adopt the three-part test set
forth in Nixon, which obligates the requesting party to establish that the desired
evidence is (1) relevant, (2) admissible, and (3) requested with adequate specificity.
[¶21.] Sheriff Milstead and the State argue that upon application of the
Nixon test, no court could reasonably conclude that the subpoenaed personnel
records should be produced for an in camera review. In contrast, Johnson contends
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering an in camera review as
he satisfied the four-part test set forth in Iozia. Johnson concedes that the records
are not open to inspection and copying by the public. But he claims the records are
discoverable as they are relevant to the primary issue in this case—whether the
true aggressor was Detective Qualseth or Johnson. These records, he argues, may
be necessary to afford him the opportunity to present a defense and fully cross
examine the State’s witnesses. We review the parties’ arguments in light of the
Nixon test.
a. Relevancy
[¶22.] “Evidence is relevant if: (a) It has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) The fact is of
6. See United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Hardy, 224 F.3d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hang, 75 F.3d 1275, 1283 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331, 346 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 998, 113 S. Ct. 597, 121 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1992); United States v. Miller, 660 F.2d 563, 565 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Marshall, CR. 08-50079-02, 2010 WL 1409445, *1-2 (D.S.D. Mag. Div. Apr. 1, 2010); United States v. Stein, 488 F. Supp. 2d 350, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Gel Spice Co., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1214, 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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consequence in determining the action.” SDCL 19-19-401. In determining the
relevancy of law enforcement personnel files, we find persuasive the often-cited
reasoning of the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Gissendanner, 399
N.E.2d 924 (N.Y. 1979). In Gissendanner, the court reviewed a lower court’s denial
of a defendant’s request to issue a subpoena for the police personnel files of
prosecution witnesses. In performing its analysis, the court discussed the
competing constitutional guarantees of compulsory process and confrontation with
the need to safeguard the confidentiality of personnel records. The court concluded
that, before production of such documents, a defendant must set forth a good-faith,
factual predicate demonstrating that it is reasonably likely that the contents of the
personnel file are material and “directly bear on the hard issue of guilt or
innocence[.]” Id. at 928. The court explained that “when a defendant shows a
likelihood that the witness’ prior criminal or disciplinary record may provide a
motive to falsify” or “when prior bad acts allegedly contained within disciplinary or
personnel records bear peculiar relevance to the circumstances of the defendant’s
case, detailed cross-examination and disclosure, usually after an in camera
inspection, have been permitted.” Id. Access to personnel files however “has been
denied [where] the defendant failed to demonstrate any theory of relevancy and
materiality, but, instead, merely desired the opportunity for an unrestrained foray
into confidential records in the hope that the unearthing of some unspecified
information would enable him to impeach the witness.” Id.
[¶23.] A number of courts across the country similarly require that the
defendant establish a good-faith, factual predicate making it reasonably likely that
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the records would yield information that will be relevant and material to the
defense. See State v. Jones, 59 A.3d 320, 333 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013), aff’d, 102 A.3d
694 (Conn. 2014) (stating information should be specific and should set forth the
issue in the case to which the personnel information will relate);7 People v. Peters,
972 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); State v. Blackwell, 845 P.2d 1017, 1019
(Wash. 1993) (en banc). As the Appellate Court of Connecticut noted in Jones, “A
showing sufficient to warrant an in camera review of a personnel file requires more
than mere speculation.” 59 A.3d at 333. See also State v. Schwartz, 552 P.2d 571,
574 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (finding defense attorney’s argument that “he had heard of a
similar incident involving one of the same officers” to be an insufficient showing);
State v. Sagner, 525 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Or. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that counsel’s
“pure conjecture” of officer’s suspected disciplinary problems was insufficient to
warrant production).
[¶24.] The Supreme Court of Washington adopted the requirement of a
factual predicate in Blackwell. 845 P.2d at 1022. Defendant sought production of
officers’ service records arguing they could lead to exculpatory evidence of improper
police conduct and/or arrests based on race and excessive force. In reversing the
trial court for ordering an in camera review, the supreme court noted that “[d]efense
counsels’ broad, unsupported claim that police officers’ personnel files may lead to
7. The Supreme Court of Connecticut in State v. Januszewski, affirmed an order for in camera review of an officer’s personnel file to verify knowledge, based on information and belief, that the officer was the subject of prior disciplinary actions. 438 A.2d 679 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S. Ct. 3159, 69 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Ray, 966 A.2d 148 (Conn. 2009).
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material information does not justify automatic disclosure of the documents.” Id. at
1021 (citing State v. Kaszubinski, 425 A.2d 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980)).
The court held that the “defendant must advance some factual predicate which
makes it reasonably likely the requested file will bear information material to his or
her defense. A bare assertion that a document ‘might’ bear such fruit is
insufficient.” Id. at 1022.
[¶25.] We endorse the analysis in Gissendanner and Blackwell and require
that Johnson establish a factual predicate showing that it is reasonably likely that
the requested file will bear information both relevant and material to his defense.
This is consistent with the approach we took in Karlen, where we required a case
specific showing of material evidence as a prerequisite for in camera review.
[¶26.] Johnson’s showing of relevance is lacking. Johnson simply argues that
Detective Qualseth used unnecessary force against him and that the requested
information in the personnel records might produce information useful to impeach
his credibility. It is well established however that “the need for evidence to impeach
witnesses is [generally] insufficient to require its production in advance of trial.”
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 701, 94 S. Ct at 3104. Johnson submitted no affidavit, no
evidence of prior conduct, no eye-witness corroboration, no statement upon
information or belief, or offer of proof. His mere allegations are insufficient to
subject the law enforcement officers’ personnel records to a general, non-specific
fishing expedition. Accordingly, he has failed to clear the first hurdle of the three
part test.
b. Specificity
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[¶27.] The requirement of specificity “ensures that the subpoenas are used
only to secure for trial certain documents or sharply defined groups of documents.”
United States v. Jackson, 155 F.R.D. 664, 667 (D. Kan. 1994) (citing United States v.
Crosland, 821 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (E.D. Va. 1993)). It also “prevents a subpoena
duces tecum . . . from being used as a ‘fishing expedition to see what may turn up.’”
United States v. Sellers, 275 F.R.D. 620, 624 (D. Nev. 2011) (quoting Bowman, 341
U.S. at 221, 71 S. Ct. at 679). Of the three requirements set forth in Nixon,
“[s]pecificity is the hurdle on which many subpoena requests stumble.” United
States v. Ruedlinger, 172 F.R.D. 453, 456 (D. Kan.1997).
[¶28.] The circuit court’s findings of fact provide that Johnson’s subpoena
duces tecum requests “[a]ll disciplinary records/reports, disciplinary actions or
complaints made against the following Minnehaha County Sheriff Department’s
employees: Detective Joe Bosman, Detective Craig Butler, and Detective Ryan
Qualseth[.]” While the subpoena did identify the types of documents, which
Johnson requested from the personnel records of Detectives Bosman, Butler, and
Qualseth, it failed to limit the requested documents to a particular time frame.
Further, Johnson’s request for “all” disciplinary records does little to narrow the
scope of the subpoena. Such broad language could require production of completely
irrelevant materials and falls far short of the specificity necessary for production.
See Arditti, 955 F.2d at 345. Johnson was unable to specify the information
contained in or believed to be contained in the requested documents. As the court
noted in United States v. Noriega, “If the moving party cannot reasonably specify
the information contained or believed to be contained in the documents sought but
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merely hopes that something useful will turn up, this is a sure sign that the
subpoena is being misused.” 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1493 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
[¶29.] Johnson has failed to establish that the subpoena satisfies the
necessary requirement of specificity. The “specificity and relevance elements
require more than the title of a document and conjecture as to its contents.” Hardy,
224 F.3d at 755 (quoting Arditti, 955 F.2d at 346). A subpoena may not issue based
upon a party’s “mere hope” that it will result in the production of favorable
evidence. Hang, 75 F.3d at 1283; United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31-32
(D.D.C. 2006). To hold otherwise would permit review of personnel records of
arresting officers in every case involving an assault upon an officer.
c. Admissibility
[¶30.] Johnson as the moving party must also make a preliminary showing
that the requested material contains admissible evidence regarding the offenses
charged. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 700, 94 S. Ct. at 3104. Sheriff Milstead argues that an
in camera review of documents, where “there is no likelihood that the requested
information ever becomes relevant or admissible in the underlying criminal
case, . . . is unnecessary and burdensome.”
[¶31.] The parties spend considerable time in their briefs to this Court
arguing about the potential admissibility of various types of evidence under Federal
Rules of Evidence 404(a), 404(b), 405, and 608. As we have found that Johnson has
failed to satisfy the first two prongs of the Nixon test, we decline to address this
factor.
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[¶32.] While the circuit court correctly determined that in certain
circumstances personnel records of law enforcement officers are subject to review, it
erred when it ordered production of the records in this case. In fairness to the
circuit court, it was faced with a question of first impression and required to resolve
the issue without direction from this Court as to what standard should be applied.
A defendant must satisfy the Nixon test. Without satisfaction of the Nixon test,
production of the requested records, including for the purposes of in camera review,
is improper.
2. Whether the circuit court erred in ordering an in camera review of portions of the three detectives’ personnel files.
[¶33.] The circuit court erred in ordering an in camera review of the
personnel records in this case. This is because Johnson failed to satisfy the
requirements of the Nixon test. In the future, if a court should determine that a
party has made an adequate showing under Nixon, an in camera review by the
circuit court is a necessary step before release of any records to the parties. Sheriff
Milstead contends that, if an in camera review occurs, “there is nothing to prevent
the trial court from providing the documents to opposing counsel without review.”
We affirm the important public policy interest in protecting the privacy and safety
of law enforcement officers by preventing unfettered access to the release of
information contained within their personnel files.8 Courts, however, routinely
8. This sentiment was well expressed in People v. Norman, where the court stated “that it is not a condition of a police officer’s employment that his life story should be the subject of perusal by judge, prosecutor and defense counsel each time he makes an arrest.” 350 N.Y.S.2d 52, 60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
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order production of confidential and even statutorily privileged documents for in
camera review in civil and criminal proceedings. And courts are authorized to
impose necessary, effective, and strict restrictions on the use of these records.
Bowman, 341 U.S. at 220, 71 S. Ct. at 678.
[¶34.] We have discussed the parameters for in camera reviews in several
cases involving production of alleged victims’ psychological records. In Maynard v.
Heeren, we considered an intermediate appeal from a circuit court’s order requiring
production of a plaintiff’s psychotherapy records. 1997 S.D. 60, ¶ 1, 563 N.W.2d
830, 832. Plaintiff’s claims involved negligent misrepresentation, slander, invasion
of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In ordering full
disclosure of the records, we required that an “in camera hearing must be held in
the presence of both parties, both parties must have access to the contested
information, and both parties must be allowed to make their record.” Id. ¶ 15, 563
N.W.2d at 836. Two years later we adopted a more circumscribed approach. See
Karlen, 1999 S.D. 12, ¶¶ 45-46, 589 N.W.2d at 604-05. We directed that upon
remand the in camera review should be conducted solely by the circuit court, with
only the relevant portions of the record being turned over to the parties for review.
We continue to adhere to the more circumscribed approach because it balances the
privacy concerns of the officer while protecting the rights of the accused.
[¶35.] Should an in camera review be deemed proper under Nixon, it is
within the sound discretion of the circuit court to determine what restrictions are
appropriate for use and dissemination of the records. If the court concludes that
portions of the records are discoverable, the court shall place “reasonable
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restrictions upon dissemination and use of the sought-after material.” Maynard,
1997 S.D. 60, ¶ 15, 563 N.W.2d at 835. The disclosure of such information must be
carefully tailored to the legitimate need for the information in the case.
Januszewski, 438 A.2d at 694. As the Court found in Nixon, “in camera inspection
of evidence is always a procedure calling for scrupulous protection against any
release or publication of material not found by the court, at that stage, probably
admissible in evidence and relevant to the issues of the trial for which it is sought.”
418 U.S. at 714, 94 S. Ct. at 3110-11 (emphasis added). The circuit court is
equipped with necessary enforcement tools, such as Rule 11, “to assure that no
privileged information is misused by the discovering litigant.” Maynard, 1997 S.D.
60, ¶ 17, 563 N.W.2d at 836; SDCL 15-6-11.
Conclusion
[¶36.] The personnel records of law enforcement officers are confidential, but
not shielded from discovery when a constitutional right of an accused is implicated.
Even so, Rule 17(c) was not intended as a tool for discovery in criminal cases. When
a party seeks production of documents under Rule 17(c), that party must first
establish that the requested evidence is (1) relevant, (2) admissible, and (3)
requested with adequate specificity. A circuit court may modify or quash a
subpoena if it determines production of the documents is oppressive or
unreasonable. If the requisite showing for production of documents is made, the
circuit court shall order the documents produced for in camera review. If the court
determines that portions of the record are discoverable, it shall carefully tailor
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necessary restrictions on the use and dissemination of the records to maintain privacy.

Outcome:

As Johnson failed to meet his burden of establishing the elements of the Nixon test, the circuit court erred in ordering Sheriff Milstead to produce portions of the personnel records of Detectives Bosman, Butler, and Qualseth for in camera review. We reverse.

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Defendant's Experts:

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